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THE APOLLO DECISION 
AND 
ITS LESSONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS 
John M. Logsdon 
1 Introduction 
The significance of the first manned voyage to the moon is likely 
to be debated for some time to come. To some observers, the lunar landing 
"marks the emergence of man from the confines of the earth, and can be 
compared with the original emergence of life from the primordial ocean; 
it sets a new stage for evolution. 'I2 To others, the lunar landing "will 
have a bad effect. It will give us the feeling, and the perfectly jus- 
tified feeling, that our world has finally closed in. This is forever the 
end of the mortal frontier . 'I3 
Whatever the resolution of this debate (and the outcome will ob- 
viously take decades, even centuries), one persistent theme has run through 
almost every commentary on the first lunar landing. 
that the moon mission has made is in establishing the simple fact that 
national goals can be reached and commitments kept of the most monumental 
kind--where there is a will to do so,'14 wrote one journalist. Two others 
"The basic contribution 
'This paper is extracted almost entirely from my forthcoming book 
The Moon Decision: Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge: 
The M.I.T. Press, 1970, in press). 
2 
J.G. Crowther, "Beyond the Pillars of Hercules," New Scientist, 
July 17, 1969, p. 144. 
3 
C.P. Snow, "The Moon Landing," - Look, August 26, 1969, p. 68. 
4James Clayton in the Washington Post, July 25, 1969, p. A26. 
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suggested that "the greatest by-product--perhaps the primary value--of 
the manned flight to the moon is moral and mental stimulus. 
that anything man can think of he can do. 
columnist concluded that what "set the moon program apart from all other 
It's evidence 
A distinguished New York Times 
national efforts of the post-war era, what finally assured its success, was 
concentration of effort and control . . . If the same concentration of effort 
and control were applied to some useful earthly project, a similar success 
might be obtained. 'I6 
The assumptions underlying statements like these go to the core of 
Western liberal philosophy. That man can do whatever he chooses, given 
only the will to do it and the techniques required, is a belief which re- 
flects motivations and characteristics basic to Western and especially to 
American civilization--a will to action, confidence in man's mastery over 
nature, a sense of mission. 
be cited as validating these assumptions for some time to come. 
7 The Promethean achievement of Apollo 11 will 
If this is so, then an understanding of how the decision to go to the 
moon was made, and why it was made, is part of the understanding of the 
strength of Western political and social institutions. By discovering how 
the United States decided to do this remarkable and ultimately very human 
thing, we may be able to find the key to how other such enterprises can be 
begun and successfully sustained. 
5Peter and Roscoe Drummond in the Houston Chronicle, July 21, 1969, p. 6. 
Tom Wicker in the New York Times, July 22, 1969, p. 32. 6 
7Theodore Geiger, The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the 
Transformation of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967), Chapter 11. 
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Or perhaps we will find that the lunar landing decision was a 
unique occurrence, a once-in-a-generation phenomenon in which a heter- 
ogeneous mixture of factors almost coincidentally converged to create 
a national commitment and enough momentum to support that commitment 
through to its fulfillment. If this should turn out to be the case, 
then an analysis of the lunar landing decision would be interesting as 
history, but of little positive value in understanding how to set other 
national goals and to initiate programs aimed at achieving them. Such an 
analysis, of course, would have the negative value of highlighting the 
limitations on the belief that "anything man can think of he can do." 
Leaders of nation-states set goals and choose policies to implement 
those goals because they decide that such goals and policies are in the 
national interest. This statement is almost tautological. It suggests 
that the national interest is nothing more than what the leaders of a 
nation say it is. In a sense this is true, for there is no other way 
to give operational content to the concept of national interest than to 
define it in terms of what those charged with governing a state conceive 
it to be. But this does not necessarily mean that the national interest 
is only the sum of the particular interests of a group of decision-makers; 
decision-makers are also members of the society they govern, and through 
them the values and aspirations characteristic of that society can find 
expression in state action. 
To understand the way in which a manned lunar landing before 1970 
was set as a national goal requires an understanding of the specific con- 
ception of the American national interest which impelled President John F. 
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Kennedy ' to  select t h a t  goal.  
a p o l i t i c a l  process extending from t h e  beginning of t h e  Space Age i n  1957 
This concept a rose ,  f i r s t  of a l l ,  ou t  of 
t o  May 1961. This paper conta ins  a s h o r t  h i s t o r y  of t h a t  process.  The 
luna r  landing dec i s ion  w a s  a dramatic mani fes ta t ion  of a more b a s i c  deci- 
s i o n  by Kennedy t o  reverse  t h e  e x i s t i n g  n a t i o n a l  space po l i cy  developed 
e a r l y  i n  t h a t  per iod while Dwight Eisenhower w a s  Pres ident .  It  w a s  made 
i n  the  crisis atmosphere t h a t  followed t h e  f i r s t  successfu l  manned space 
f l i g h t  by Soviet  cosmonaut P u r i  Gagarin and t h e  American f a i l u r e  a t  t h e  
Bay of Pigs .  
However, t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  i s  a l s o  based on notions transcending 
the  outcome of a p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  process.  This paper also examines 
the  l a s t i n g  content of t h e  concept of American n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  which w a s  
t he  b a s i s  of Kennedy's dec is ion .  The s e c u r i t y  of t he  United States,  i t s  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and i t s  c u l t u r e  were elements here ,  bu t  f a c t o r s  beyond 
s e c u r i t y  were involved. These included an almost Messianic, expansive 
d r i v e ,  one r e s u l t i n g  i n  a sense of des t iny  and mission which has  f o r  a 
long t i m e  been p a r t  of t he  Ameltican world view. This d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  
American n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  i s  a l s o  a t  t h e  b a s i s  of such n a t i o n a l  under- 
tak ings  as t h e  Vietnamese w a r ,  and thus t h i s  paper can be placed i n  t h e  
context of t h e  ongoing examination of and debate over an appropr ia te  
American n a t i o n a l  purpose i n  world p o l i t i c s .  8 
8This paper does not eva lua te  the  va lues  underlying t h i s  concept of 
t he  American n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .  
b a s i c ,  t a sk  i n  understanding t h e  na tu re  of American s o c i e t y  and i ts  p o l i t i c a l  
system. 
desc r ip t ion  and a n a l y s i s  of t h i s  concept. 
Such an eva lua t ion  i s  another ,  perhaps more 
The purpose of t h i s  paper is l imi t ed  t o  providing an  empir ica l  
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Once the process by which the lunar landing decision was made has 
been sketched and the American aspirations underlying that decision iden- 
tified, it may be possible to isolate the circumstances in which this 
nation and its leaders can undertake other such "great new American enter- 
prises." 
this direction. 
The final section of this paper contains some suggestions in 
9 
How the Decision was Made 
The early months of 1961 were sobering for the new administration of 
President John F. Kennedy. 
pledged to get the country moving after eight years of the Eisenhower pres- 
idency, but they seemed unable to make any substantial changes in government 
structures or activities. Late in March, after a month of intense deliber- 
ations, President Kennedy almost had decided to send American troops to fight 
Kennedy and his associates came to Washington 
the Communists in Laos; he rejected intervention only after learning that 
60,000 troops would be needed. In Congress the ambitious New Frontier 
legislative program seemed bogged down. 
Early on the morning of April 12, even more galling news reached the 
White House. 
his science adviser, Jerome Wiesner, told him that the Soviet Union would 
It was not unexpected. When Kennedy went to bed on the 11th 
probably attempt to launch a man into space the next day. Wiesner was right; 
before dawn in Washington, the Soviets announced that astronaut Yuri Gagarin 
This condensed narrative of the decision was originally publlshed 9 
in the Long Island daily newspaper, Newsday, July 17, 1969. 
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had successfully orbited the earth in his Vostok spaceship. 
first to launch a satellite in 1957, now had become the first nation to 
achieve manned space flight. 
The Russians, 
The Soviet Union was quick to capitalize on the propaganda signifi- 
cance of Gagarin's flight, Nikita Krushchev, talking to Gagarin while he 
was still in orbit, boasted, "Let the capitalist countries catch up with 
our country!" 
"embodied the genius of the Soviet people and the powerful force of 
socialism. '' 
The Communist Central Committee claimed that the flight 
Self-congratulation was not particularly necessary. The world was 
almost unanimous in admiration. 
flight ''a universal good. 
Even the Vatican newspaper called the 
Within a few hours, questioning and criticism began. Rep. Victor 
Anfuso (D-Brooklyn) called for a full-scale congressional 'investlgation and 
suggested that the U.S. be "mobilized to a wartime basis" in order to beat 
the Soviets to the moon. A Washington newspaper called the Gagarin flight 
"a psychological victory of the 'first magnitude for the Soviet Union." 
Kennedy told a late-afternoon press conference April 12 that "no one is 
more tired than I am" of being second to the Soviets in space, but that he 
hoped to find "other areas where we can be first and which will bring more 
long-range benefits to mankind. I t  
However much Kennedy might have wanted to find some other arena of 
competition, within a few days he became convinced that the U.S. had to 
enter the space race in earnest. Wiesner remembers that "we talked a lot 
about whether we had to do this. He said to me, 'If you had a scientific 
-7- 
spectacular on this earth that would be more useful or something that is 
just as dramatic and convincing as space, then we would do it.' But, 
says Wiesner, Kennedy "became convinced that space was the symbol of the 
20th Century. 
was right for the country. 
It was a decision he made cold-bloodedly, He thought it 
,'lo 
On the evening of April 14, Kennedy called a meeting to learn how to 
win the space race. Assembled in the cabinet room were Wiesner; Kennedy's 
closest aide, Ted Sorenson; Budget Director David Bell; NASA Administrator 
James E. Webb; and his deputy, Hugh Dryden. Kennedy wanted to know, "Is 
there any place we can catch them?" He got no clear answer. Dryden sug- 
gested a crash lunar landing program, but Webb and Wiesner were cautious, 
and Bell warned that the cost of such an undertaking could exceed $40 billion. 
At the end of the meeting Kennedy.thought aloud: "When we know more, I can 
decide if it is worth it or not. If somebody can just tell me how to catch 
up." Then he turned to the others, adding, "There is nothing more important. ,,11 
Ki-%neCZy"s wtllrngness to respond to the Soviet challenge was predictable, 
given the new President's views on the nature of his job and of the inter- 
national and domestic political setting in which the challenge was placed. 
He believed in an activist presidency and thought that he could couple his 
own forceful personality to the inherent power of the office in order to 
move the nation in the direction he chose. Kennedy, of course, came from a 
fiercely competitive family, and he was not accustomed to avoiding challenges. 
My interview with Jerome B. Wiesner, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
10 
September 11, 1967. 
Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President (New York: Acheneum P r e s s ,  11 
1964), p. 122. 
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He held to the prevailing anti-Communist view of American foreign policy, 
one which saw the Soviet Union as a real threat to American security and 
to a democratic way of life. And Kennedy was an expert politician. He 
could sense public sentiment on an issue, and Ted Sorenson says that "the 
Gagarin flight and the reaction to it around the world and in this country 
and in Congress demonstrated to the President the importance of going ahead 
with an all-out space effort and the willingness of the country and the 
Congress to back such an effort. 1112 
Sorenson also suggests that Kennedy had both "affirmative and nega- 
tive" reasons for choosing to accelerate the space program. 
"affirmative in the sense that the United States intended to maintain its 
position of world leadership, its position of eminence in commerce, in 
science, in foreign policy and in whatever else might develop from space 
exploration," Sorenson said. "The negative side was that we did not want 
to have the Soviets dominating space to a point where, at some future time, 
it could be a military threat to our security." 
was concerned with the feeling that "the rest of the world had been led to 
believe by Soviet space accomplishments, and particularly by the U.S. reaction 
to them, that the scientifically and technologically most competent nation 
now was the Soviet Union, not the United States. 
kinds of ways--internationally, politically--and that was the issue the 
President was dealing with. N o t  was it time to go t o  the moon, but how 
could you get yourself out of this? 
They were 
13 Wiesner says Kennedy 
We were paying a price all 
1114 
~~ ~~ 
'5, interview with Theodore C .  Sorenson, New York, October 5 ,  1967. 
14wiesner interview. 
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Then came the Bay of Pigs. On April 17 United States-trained Cuban 
refugees attempted to invade Cuba and overthrow the Castro government. By 
the 19th Castro had crushed the invasion as the United States stood by, un- 
willing to intervene on behalf of its protdg6s. 
press secretary, described these three days as the "grimmest" of Kennedy's 
time in the White House. 
Pierre Salinger, Kennedy's 
How much Kennedy's state of mind resulting from the Cuban fiasco in- 
fluenced or reinforced his resolve to proceed rapidly in space is not com- 
pletely clear. The Bay of Pigs was never explicitly linked to changes in 
the space program during any of the meetings on space held at this time. 
But Wiesner says of the Bay of Pigs, "I don't think anyone can measure it, 
but I am sure it had an impact. 
to get something else in the foreground. It wasn't his primary motivation, 
but I think the Bay of Pigs put him into a mood to run harder than he might 
have. 
that "the Soviets had gained tremendous worldwide prestige from the Gagarin 
flight at the same time we had suffered a loss of prestige from the Bay of 
Pigs. It pointed up the fact that prestige was a real, and not simply a 
public relations, factor in world affairs. 
is quite possible that, if the Bay of Pigs had been a resounding success, 
the President might have dawdled a little longer on the space decision. 
I think the President felt some pressure 
Sorenson says that Kennedy's attitude was influenced by the fact 
McGeorge Bundy adds that "It 
,117 
151bid. 
Sorenson interview. 16 
17 
My interview with McGeorge Bundy, New York, October 4 ,  1967. 
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Even though Kennedy seems to have decided as early as April 14 that 
he would approve an accelerated space program aimed at winning some firsts 
in the space race, he knew very little of the details of the space program. 
Kennedy needed more information before he could make a definitive decision. 
The day after the Bay of Pigs invasion collapsed, he acted to get that 
information. 
Kennedy's Vice President, Lyndon Johnson, did know a great deal about 
the space program. On the night that Sputnik I went into orbit in 1957, 
Johnson had set the wheels moving to begin a congressional investigation 
of America's missile and space program by a subcommittee on preparedness 
that he chaired. He was the chief congressional architect of the bill 
establishing NASA in 1958. Then he became the chairman of the Senate 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee. After the 1960 election, 
Kennedy named Johnson to head the National Aeronautics and Space Council, 
the President's advisory body for space policy. 
On April 20 Kennedy asked Johnson, as chairman of the Space Council, 
to make "an overall survey of where we stand in space" and especially to 
get the information the President needed: 
the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, 
or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and 
back w&th a man? 
results in which we could win? 
"Do we have a chance of beating 
Is there any other space program which promises dramatic 
,118 
For the three years since Sputnik, Johnson had been an advocate of a 
more aggressive, politically-oriented space program. He knew those in and 
18 Memorandum from John F. Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, April 20, 1961. 
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out of goyernment who shared his views well. 
President, they had been unable to gain approval for space projects as 
ambitious as they thought were needed. After Sputnik the Eisenhower 
administration adopted a conservative space policy and stuck to that 
policy through the rest of Ike's second term. 
space race between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
reverse the Eisenhower policy, to enter the space race, and to approve 
spaee projects justified in political terms. 
space enthusiasts to help him prepare a new space program. 
While Dwight Eisenhower was 
The policy ruled out a 
Now Kennedy had decided to 
Johnson called on his fellow 
Given the presidential directive, Johnson quickly organized a series 
of meetings. 
the project that gave the best chance of a U.S. first. 
assistant for space was Edward Welsh, who remembers that "running through 
the discussions was the theme, could we go to the moon, should we if we 
could, how much would it cost, what else did we need to do if we decided to 
It did not take long to find that there was a consensus on 
Johnson's top staff 
Answers to these questions were available, for much thought had al- 19 go? ' 1  
ready been given to the feasibility of a manned lunar landing program. 
Both the Air Force and the Army had developed plans for an ambitious 
military space program in the post-Sputnik rivalry for control of the nation's 
space efforts. 
as a goal; the services had thus developed detailed analyses of what such an 
undertaking would require. 
Each of these programs had featured a manned lunar landing 
One Army plan, prepared by Wernher von Braun's 
"Quoted in Edwin Diamond, The Rise and Fall of the Space Age 
(Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday and Company, 1964), p. 34. 
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team of German rocket experts (who worked under Army direction until 
19591, called for establishing a 12-man lunar outpost by the end of 1966. 
In 1959 NASA planners also had chosen a lunar landing as the most 
valid technological goal of an advanced manned space flight program. 
Throughout 1959 and 1960, they studied ways of accomplishing this feat. 
By 1960 their planning was advanced enough for NASA's leaders to give the 
project a name--Apollo--and to ask for White House permission to begin 
building a spacecraft for the initial steps toward a lunar landing: long- 
duration flight in earth orbit and flight around the moon. 
President Eisenhower refused to approve this request. He believed 
that allocating the funds needed for such projects was not justified. 
science advisers told him that the cost of a lunar landing would run from 
$34 to $46 billion, and that this much money for space would not produce 
enough scientific knowledge to justify that great an investment of funds. 
In December, just before leaving office, Eisenhower told NASA that he would 
not approve any project aimed at a lunar landing. 
His 
NASA did not abandon its plans; a new President would soon be in office. 
Meanwhile, a task force chaired by George Low (zho in December 1969 
Deputy Administrator of NASA) made a quick but thorough assessment of all 
available material related to the lunar landing project. By the end of 
February 
In late March 
but he deferred his decision. NASA had yet to launch a man into space, and 
the President preferred to wait for a few successful flights in Project 
Mercury before committing himself to a second-generation manned flight program. 
became 
Low's group concluded that a lunar landing by 1967 was feasible. 
NASA asked President Kennedy to approve Project Apollo plans, 
-13- 
The .events of April altered the political climate, and Kennedy no 
longer was willing to wait. 
which had convinced the agency's officials that a manned lunar landing 
was a technologically and scientifically worthwhile goal, now was to be 
the basis for a decision to use the space program as an instrument of 
American national strategy. Webb told Johnson that "there is 
a chance for the U.S. to be the first to land a man on the moon and return 
him to earth if a determined national effort is made. 
date for a manned lunar landing is 1967. 
The planning that NASA had already done, 
On April 22 
A possible target 
1120 
Two days later Johnson consulted space experts from the Air Force 
Among those Johnson con- and Navy and others whose judgment he trusted. 
sulted, there was unanimous agreement that the lunar landing objective 
made sense. Wernher von Braun told the Vice President that the U.S. had 
"an excellent chance of beating the Soviets to the first landing of a crew 
on the moon." He believed that ''a performance jump by a factor of 10 over 
their present rockets is necessary to accomplish this feat" and "therefore, 
we would not have to enter the race toward this obvious next goal in space 
exploration against hopeless odds favoring the Soviets." Von Braun thought 
that "with an all-out crash program" the U . S .  could achieve a lunar landing 
by 1967 or 1968.21 
The next week was spent gaining assurances that the accelerated program 
would receive congressional support. Finally, on Friday, May 5, Johnson asked 
2oMemorandum from NASA to Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, April 22, 1961. 
Memorandum from Wernher von Braun to Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, 21 
April 29, 1961. 
-14- 
NASA and the Department of Defense to meet over the weekend to prepare 
a detailed set of recommendations incorporating the results of his con- 
sultations. 
lowing Monday before leaving on a two-week tour of Asia. 
Alan Shepard completed a 15-minute suborbital flight, thus becoming the 
first American in space. A wave of national relief and pride over this 
American success swept the country, removing whatever obstacles may have 
remained in the path of Kennedy's space decision. 
Johnson wanted to present these to the President the fol- 
That same Friday, 
Webb, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and their staffs met at the 
Pentagon May 6 .  After an all-day session, they concluded that the manned 
lunar landing project did indeed provide the best chance of beating the 
Soviets to a spectacular space first. They thought that this project 
should be made a national goal in order to have both the international and 
domestic impact desired. A memorandum incorporating this recommendation 
and others concerned with every aspect of the space program was prepared 
the following day and given to the Vice President at noon Monday. Johnson 
approved the memorandum and gave. it to Kennedy later that afternoon. Kennedy 
ratified the new space program without changing anything. 
On May 25 Kennedy announced his decision to a joint session of Congress 
in a speech labeled "Urgent National Needs." He said that: 
Now is the time to take longer strides--time for a great 
new American enterprise--time for this nation to take a 
clearly leading role in space achievement, which in many 
ways may hold the key to our future on earth. 
I believe that this nation should commit itself to 
achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing 
a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth. 
I believe we should go to the moon. 
-15- 
Space and,the National Interest 
John Kennedy made the lunar landing d ision because his definition 
of the national interest led him to conclude, under the stimulus of the 
Gagarin flight, that a prestige-oriented space program was an appropriate, 
even though very costly, instrument of American foreign policy. Kennedy's 
view of the national interest included the general notion that the United 
States should be superior in power to any other nation; in the context of 
1961, this meant especially superior in power to the Soviet Union. 
One element in the lunar landing decision was therefore straight- 
forward balance-of-power politics. Since World War 11, "a supreme pur- 
pose of American power in world politics" has been "destroying, transforming, 
or at least containing Soviet strength. 
purpose is containment, which in its original formulation 
"Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is 
something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of 
counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political 
points . . . The notion that the United States should enter a contest 
with the Soviet Union for the prestige accruing from space success was based 
on the rationale that this prestige was an element in the Cold War competition ' 
for national power and international influence. 
the U.S. point of view, part of an effort to contain the expansion of Soviet 
power. 
The policy derived from this 
postulated that 
Such a competition was, from 
Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy (New York: Random 22 
House, 19631, p. 357. 
George Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 (New York: New 23 
American Library, 19521, p. 99, 
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The choice of space technology as an instrument of America's 
global strategy was also a reflection of the American national style. 
Stanley Hoffmann has defined national style as the "common features 
displayed by policy-makers and interested elites, features which 
become evident in responses to crises. In these situations, says 
Hof fmann : 
What is action and what is reaction, what is spon- 
taneous reflex and what is rational response to ex- 
ternal pressures are never really separable . . . 
However, the tensions manifest when an individual 
or a nation is forced to absorb and adjust to unwel- 
come necessities, the joys and hopes (and boasts) 
displayed when a challenge is precisely of the kind 
which the person or country is best equipped to handle, . . . all the perceptions and responses to the outside 
world are very much the "stuff" of the national style. 25 
America's national style is based on an "experience, from the 
Puritans to the space age" which has primarily been one of mastery over 
nature. "The kind of contest for the mastery of man characteristic of 
other societies has not been a permanent or dominant feature of American 
life." 
trol of men but at control of nature, might be characterized as "a pure 
triumph of technology. For this reason, concludes Hoffmann, "the basic 
This experience, in which American energies were aimed not at con- 
elements of the American style . . give an eminent position and legitimacy 
to technological anti-communism. 27 The lunar landing program, aimed at beating 
Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American 24 
Foreign Policy (New York: 
1968), p. 88. 
McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 
251bid -* 9 p. 90. 
261bid., p. 147. 
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the Soviets to the moon, is perhaps an ultimate expression of "techno- 
logical anti-communism," in which the competition is conducted in terms of 
which way of life can best master nature, not control men. 
There is another sense in which the use of space technology as an 
instrument of national strategy reflected particularly American charac- 
teristics. For America, science and technology have become "the enterprise 
of the nation." Since World War 11, the United States has "placed itself 
at the head of the scientific competition of nations. More than twenty 
years of history already forbid it to lose that place." This enterprise 
, "is indissolubly linked to the goals of American society, which is trying 
to build its future on the progress of science and technology." Thus 
scientific and technological research appears as the main way of access 11 
to this future in which the drive and the ambitions shown by a whole nation 
will be expressed. ,128 
The drives and ambitions of the American nation were reflected in the 
lunar landing decision not only by the choice of technological means to 
achieve a national goal, but also by the goal itself. 
involved in the lunar landing decision than balance of power politics in 
the Realpolitik mode. The definition of the American national interest 
which guided Kennedy's actions was not limited to maintaining a Eurasian 
balance of power which would guarantee America's physical security. 
1961, already, the thermonuclear "balance of terror" had created a situation 
in which the physical security of the United States was no longer dependent 
For there was more 
By 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Reviews of 28 
National Science Policy: The United States (Paris: OECD, 1968), pp. 346-47 .  
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on time-honored calculations of a balance of power. There was clear I1 
realization that a lunar landing program would not contribute directly or 
significantly to the nation's military defense; the reasons for enhancing 
national prestige were political, not military. These reasons implied goals 
for American foreign policy beyond physical security, goals reflected in 
a peculiarly American concept of national interest. 
The concept of the American national interest which Kennedy held 
included "protecting not only the nation's territory but also its basic 
values as a society . . . From this definition followed the conclusion 
that not only was it in the American interest to prevent, using the tech- 
niques of the balance of power, the formation of a militarily superior 
Eurasian coalition, but also that it was "equally in the American interest 
that the societies of Eurasia develop along lines broadly consistent with 
the nation's own ideology; for under modern conditions it is difficult to 
envisage the survival of a democratic American society as an island in a 
totalitarian sea. 'I3' This definition of American national interest resulted 
in American security being identified not only with protection from external 
attack, but with "a purpose or mission that encompasses all humanity, a 
purpose that gives to the nation's existence, hence its security, a potentially 
limitless dimension. 1132 
Robert W. Tucker, Nation or knpire? The Debate Over American 29 
Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 33. 
Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena: An Essay 30 
in Recent History (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 544. 
311bid. -
32 Tucker, p. 37. 
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What Kennedy sought i n  deciding as he d id  w a s  t o  maintain American 
preeminence i n  a l l  a spec t s  of n a t i o n a l  power; t h i s  quest  f o r  preemiaence 
followed l o g i c a l l y  from h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .  Thus, i n  
the last ana lys i s ,  understanding the lunar  landing dec is ion  r equ i r e s  one 
t o  realize t h a t  i t  r e f l e c t e d  a conception of America's i n t e r e s t s  which 
ass igns  primacy t o  fo re ign  over domestic goals ,  and t h a t  t h e  fo re ign  
pol icy  goa ls  included no t  j u s t  p ro t ec t ion  from e x t e r n a l  a t t a c k ,  o r  c l o s e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  o the r  na t ions  wi th  complementary cu l tu re s  o r  i n t e r e s t s ,  
bu t  rather extended t o  an expansive American mission of spreading i ts  way 
of l i f e  t o  a l l  corners of t h e  globe. 
' 
The many criticisms of the lunar  landing dec i s ion  which suggest that 
the resources which have been a l l o c a t e d  t o  manned space f l i g h t  could b e t t e r  
have been used f o r  o t h e r  n a t i o n a l  purposes can b e  evaluated i n  l i g h t  of t h i s  
conclusion. Such criticisms r e s u l t  i n  dramatic statements l i k e  Warren 
Weaver's l i s t i n g  of what could be accomplished by t h e  $30 b i l l i o n  he estimated 
t h e  luna r  landing program would cost :  (1) give every teacher  i n  t h e  United 
States a t e n  percent raise each year f o r  two years ;  (2) endow 200 co l leges  
wi th  $10 m i l l i o n  each; (3) f inance  t h e  education of 50,000 s c i e n t i s t s  
through co l l ege  and graduate school a t  $4,000 per  year;  ( 4 )  b u i l d  t e n  new 
medical schools a t  $200 mi l l i on  each; (5) bu i ld  and endow complete univer- 
sities f o r  the f i f t y - t h r e e  count r ies  added t o  the United Nations between 
1945 and 1962; and (6) c r e a t e  three new Rockefel ler  Foundations worth 
$500 m i l l i o n  each .33 More r e s t r a i n e d  i s  Alvin Weinberg's oppos i t ion  
33 
Warren Weaver, "What a Moon Ticket W i l l  Buy," Saturday Review of 
L i t e r a t u r e ,  August 4, 1962, pp. 38-39. 
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t o  the luna r  program because of what he judges t o  b e  i ts  "remoteness from 
human a f f a i r s .  1134 
The easy response t o  these crit icisms is  t o  d i v e r t  a t t e n t i o n  from 
the space program by poin t ing  out  the immense amounts spent  on a lcohol ,  
c i g a r e t t e s ,  some o the r  luxury, o r  e s p e c i a l l y  on n a t i o n a l  defense,  and then 
asking whether these expenditures are n o t  b e t t e r  sources  of resources  f o r  
added s o c i a l  and economic wel fare  spending. But this  response, i t  seems 
t o  m e ,  begs the quest ion,  and I b e l i e v e  a more adequate response e x i s t s .  
One needs t o  ask here: "What human a f f a i r s  are i n  f a c t  remote 
from spending on t h e  moon program?" Weinberg assumes t h a t  they are those  
s o  dramatical ly  s p e l l e d  out  by Weaver: education, sc ience ,  h e a l t h ,  economic 
development, and t h e  like. But c e r t a i n l y  these  do no t  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  t o t a l -  
i t y  of t h e  concerns of man and h i s  state. The weaver-Weinberg criticisms 
imply that U.S. domestic goals  should have p r i o r i t y  over e x t e r n a l  goals ,  o r  
a t  least those ex te rna l  goals  beyond t h e  b a s i c  one of providing f o r  n a t i o n a l  
s e c u r i t y .  Once t h i s  premise is understood, t h e  debate  over t h e  wisdom of 
t h e  luna r  landing dec is ion  rises t o  a broader level of gene ra l i t y ,  f o r  the 
dec is ion ,  as I have j u s t  suggested,  emerged from p r i o r i t i e s  ass igning  
higher  importance i n  the American decision-making process t o  the broad 
fore ign  po l i cy  goa l  of g loba l  preeminence than t o  the domestic goa l  of 
improving t h e  q u a l i t y  of our n a t i o n a l  l i f e .  These p r i o r i t i e s  d e r i v e  from 
an expansive concept of American n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  which American 
34 
Alvin K. Weinberg, "Criteria f o r  S c i e n t i f i c  Choice," i n  Sanford 
A. Lakoff,  ed. ,  Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government 
(New York: The Free Press ,  19661, p. 417. 
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security becomes synonymous with a particular conception of world order 
and which implies a mission involving the use of all national resources 
necessary to ensure that this form of world order is attained. 
issue then becomes whether this is an appropriate purpose for the American 
nation. 
The 
Criticism of the lunar landing decision was relatively muted in 1961 
and 1962; only in 1963 did such criticism take on nation-wide d$mensions, 
occupy the attention of the mass media, and surface on the floors of Congress. 
This criticism may have been the first manifestation of a great debate over 
national priorities which is still going on and which, since 1965, has cen- 
tered on the issues of the Vietnam war and continued investment in military 
technology. 
The ongoing debate over existing national priorities is a real debate 
because there are cogent arguments on many sides. 
debate, and the reason why it did not begin until 1963, was probably the 
1962 Cuban missile crisis, which dramatized the inherent dangers of an 
expansive foreign policy in the thermonuclear era. 
of racial discontent the nation has experienced in the mid-1960s 
equally dramatic the need for increased attention to America's domestic 
problems. 
American national interest which gives priority to foreign policy goals is 
not just a product of the Cold War, but rather has deep roots in the American 
experience and mentality. To suggest that these priorities are wrong and 
should be changed is t o  go against a great amount of societal inertia, at 
least, and perhaps also societal wisdom. 
The stimulus to the 
The "long, hot summers" 
have made 
The debate has lasted until now because the conception of 
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Yet the critics Qf our current national priorities may well be 
correct, for it appears that, in the contemporary world, following these 
priorities will require more Vietnam-like interventions in the affairs of 
other societies and continued investments 
forces in order that the kind of world order defined as necessary for 
America's purpose be at all possible. 
military spending, however, may underminebthe way of life they seek 
to preserve and spread, if the Vietnamese experience is any lesson for the 
future . 
in maintaining superior military 
Such interventions and continued 
There is a crucial difference between the Vietnamese intervention 
and continued buildup of military force on one hand, and the lunar landing 
decision on the other. 
American national interest, but the two military means of achieving that 
interest go against our traditional distaste for the use of force in foreign 
All three derive from the same conception of 
relations. The choice of space competition as an arena for demonstrating 
American power is a characteristic manifestation of the American national 
style. For most of our national history, we have attempted to spread our 
way of life by demonstrating the economic and social success it has pro- 
duced. 
replaced by primary dependence on the use of military power to achieve our 
national objectives in world politics. Part of the current national debate 
involves questioning the continued relevance of military means as instru- 
ments of national power in an international political system 
thermonuclear balance of terror makes the use of nuclear weapons irrational 
and where the techniques of insurgency movements makes the attempts to use 
military means of halting them seem like falling into a pool of quicksand. 
Only after World War I1 was this technique of our foreign policy 
where the 
-a 3- 
By contrast, the decision to send men to the moon was a return to 
the earlier technique of demonstrating the continued dynamism and power 
of American society through example, not coercion. In a world in which 
economic and social change increasingly results from scientific and tech- 
nological developments, such a demonstration of the superiority of Amer- 
ican technology and the ability to use that superiority to achieve an 
announced national goal is likely to have significant international poli- 
tical effects. For 
it is corollary that any nation with the power to . . . 
undertake voyages to the moon must have the power to do 
much more. Any nation with this kind of wealth to devote 
to such adventures must have even greater surpluses 
available for even more basic investments, Anv nation 
capable of harnessing its industrial, scientific and tech- 
nological talents on so vast a scale for so long a time 
must surely be capable of harnessing these means and the 
necessary public consensus to the solutions of problems 
even more challenging, problems even more important to 
the welfare of our society and of the future world.35 
In the final account, critics of the social utility of the lunar 
landing decision are really calling for a different kind of world and a 
different kind of America, ones in which the "necessary public consensus" 
to support enterprises of the scope of the lunar landing program is 
available to support other large-scale undertakings. If this should 
occur, the experience of the nation in choosing a difficult goal and in 
mobilizing the resources to accomplish it may well be relevant. 
John Rubel, "Advanced Space Technology and the Future Political 35 
Economy," 
(Washington, D . C . :  American Astronautical Society, 1966), p. 363. 
in Impact of Space Exploration on Society, ed. by W.E. Frye 
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The Lessons of Apollo 
James Reston has suggested that "one of the lessons of the . . . 
voyage to the moon is that the American mind and the American political 
system seem to need great challenges and clear goals to work at their 
best." 
to solving other national problems, because it had "imagination, it mobil- 
ized intelligence. It had a specific goal within a specific time . . . 
The whole idea of America was to create a society nobody had ever created 
before, and it could be that the moon-men, with their concentration, pur- 
pose, and timetable have shown us the way." 
To evaluate this suggestion requires deciding whether the way in which 
Reston suggests that "the moon project may have given us the key" 
36 
Project Apollo was conceived and initiated has any relevance to an under- 
standing of how other such large-scale undertakings can be begun and suc- 
cessfully sustained. There has been, in the wake of the Apollo 11 mission, 
a plethora of discussion about using for other purposes the techniques for 
organizing and directing "the massed endeavors of scores of thousands 
of minds in a close-knit, mutually enhancive combination of govern- 
ment, university, and private industry," techniques which some sug- 
gest constitute "potentially the most powerful tool in man's history. 1137 
Before such a transfer of techniques can be effected, a decision on whether 
they can be used, and for what purposes, must be made. This analysis of 
James Reston in the 36 
Tom Alexander , "The 37 
July, 1969, p. 114. 
New York Times, July 18, 1969, p. 30. 
Unexpected Payoff of Project Apollo," Fortune, 
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the lunar landing decision indicates conditions under which such a 
decision is possible, if that decision is to initiate an undertaking 
which has a high chance of being successful. 
One important element of the legitimacy of a government is its 
record of success in achieving objectives to which it becomes committed. 
In selecting specific objectives for governmental action (as opposed to 
enunciating very broad goals such as racial equality or world peace), 
political leaders must be concerned about the likelihood of their being 
successful in the actions they initiate. In the case of the lunar landing 
decision, this type of consideration was of central importance to those 
considering possible new programs in space. After President Kennedy had 
first tentatively decided that the United States should enter a space 
race with the Soviet Union with the aim of coming out ahead, his next 
concern was whether such an outcome was feasible. He asked Vice President 
Johnson to find a space program '"which promises dramatic results in which 
we could win." Johnson's consultations with space experts established 
that a project aimed at a manned lunar landing was technologically feasible. 
No "technological breakthroughs" were required for its accomplishment; what 
was needed was an extension of the basic technological capabilities already 
under development or study in 1961. 
When Kennedy asked whether there was a feasible way of winning the 
space race, he could expect an answer with a high probability of its being 
correct. This was because he was dealing with an engineering problem, the 
question of whether a particular technological feat could be accomplished. 
If Kennedy had asked whether something that involved control over human 
behavior, rather than control over things, could be accomplished, he would 
-26- 
likely not have been able to get nearly as precise an answer. He thus 
would have had to run much more of a risk of failure in committing his 
administration and the United States to accomplishing this "softer" kind 
of objective than he did in committing himself to the lunar landing goal. 
This suggests that "Apollo-like" undertakings, ones committing the 
nation to achieving a challenging objective on a specific timetable, 
should be begun only when the feasibility of the objective sought can be 
determined with some degree of confidence at the time the decision to seek 
it is made. 
Obviously, the kinds of undertakings most susceptible to this type 
of judgment are technological, i.e., ones in which the basic principles 
upon which action is to be based are established and the problem is applying 
these principles to specific ends. This need not be a severely limiting 
qualification. Alvin Weinberg agrees that "many problems that are tradi- 
tionally viewed as being primarily social possess stronger technological 
components than one at first suspects. They therefore may admit to tech- 
nologicalpalliatives, or even 'fixes,' which hopefully can buy the time 
necessary to get at the cause of the social problem. Among the candi- 
dates that Weinberg lists for such "technological fixes" are many of the 
11 great and pressing questions, upon whose resolution the future stability 
11 of our society depends . . ., such as poverty, all-out war, air pollution, 
water supply, food, population control, and transportation. 39 I would add 
38 
Alvin M. Weinberg, "Social Problems and National Socio-Technical 
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to the list. aspects of health, education, and housing. Solutions to 
these problems involve breaking them down into identifiable and feasible 
tasks, and deciding to allocate the resources needed to accomplish them. 
But the basic requirement for such a decision is the knowledge that these 
tasks are feasible. 
This raises a further point. How is it possible to know whether in 
fact a particular technological task can be done successfully? 
point and on what basis can the government commit resources to a specific 
project? 
At what 
The post-World-War-I1 response of the American government to these 
questions has been continuing investment of significant national resources 
in supporting scientific research and preliminary development. This invest- 
ment has been justified on the basis of a number of rationales, but a 
primary justification has been the "utility of basic research as the foun- 
dation of all technological development. 1140 The leaders of American poli- 
tics have realized that many of the activities which the government under- 
takes cannot be sustained in the contemporary world without a healthy basic 
science base upon which to draw. 
national defense purposes, but also holds true for other aspects of govern- 
ment activity. 
for several years previously space scientists and engineers in government 
service, in universities, and in industry had been examining the problems 
of such an undertaking, had isolated the areas in which further research 
This has of course been particularly so for 
The lunar landing decision could be made in 1961 because 
40 Michael D. Reagan, Science and the Federal Patron (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 36. Reagan discusses the various criteria 
advanced for federal support of science in pp. 34-70 of his book. 
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was required, and had done enough exploratory work to conclude that 
there were no knowledge barriers to carrying out a lunar mission. 
Similar reservoirs of knowledge exist, largely as a result of con- 
tinued governmental support, in other areas of potential governmental 
action. 
sciences and life sciences, but is also coming to be so with respect to 
many of the social sciences. A recent report recommended that the govern- 
ment increase its support of behavioral science research in order that 
"the knowledge and methods of the behavioral sciences, devoted as they are 
to an understanding of human behavior and social institutions" can be 
This is especiallv true with respect to the "harder" physical 
applied "as effectively as possible to the programs and policy process of 
the federal government. 'I4' 
then the level of confidence in decisioe involving "social engineering" 
might be raised nearer to that involved in non-human engineering oper- 
ations. 
If such an investment were to prove successful, 
"Apollo-like" decisions are thus in the first account likely to be 
feasible only when those making the decision can confidently expect success 
in its outcome. 
For example, the United States has found that, at least in Viet Nam,  it does 
This qualification eliminates a wide variety of undertakings 
not know how to achieve the outcome it desires in an insurgency situation. 
The elimination of racial prejudice, as deeply-seated in human emotions as 
it is, is another unlikely candidate for a "technological fix." So is the 
'lNationa1 Academy of Sciences , Advisory Committee on Government 
Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, The Behavioral Sciences and the Federal 
Government (Washington: National Academy of Sciences , 1968) , p. 17. 
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replacement: of the nation-state by some other form of political organ- 
ization. Other examples could be added to this list, but these should 
suffice to make my point, that the "Apollo approach" will not work when 
the end desired requires significant changes in deep-seated behavior 
patterns. 
The range of undertakings which are susceptible to engineering 
solutions remains, however, certainly wide enough to absorb the energies 
and resources of the United States. Finding objectives with high social 
utility which can be achieved by a specific time using technologies, 
. either physical or social, which are based on existing knowledge is not 
difficult. What is difficult is creating a base within the political sys- 
tem which makes it possible for the system's leaders, while they are con- 
sidering whether or not to act, to determine if they can obtain and keep 
the support necessary fo r  a given program to be accomplished. 
To create such a base within the American political system is an 
exceedingly difficult task. Because of the pluralism of American society 
and of its republican political institutions, it involves combining and 
keeping together individuals and groups with a wide variety of interests 
and perspectives. 
political leaders will hesitate to make a long-range but specific commitment, 
even though they have identified a desirable and feasible objective. 
corresponding strength of our system is that such a base of support, made up 
as it is of diverse elements, provides a flexible and powerful means of 
getting things accomplished on a large scale. The various institutions of modern 
American society--government, industry, and the universities, especially-- 
Without assurance that such a combination can be created, 
A 
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have become so interwoven that they together form a single reserve of 
skill and resources which, if it can be channeled by the society's 
leaders toward a common goal, can achieve much. 
The arena in which the separate interests comprising American society 
interact is the political process. This nation does not have, and probably 
never will have, a single, agreed-upon set of priorities for governmental 
action. 
the range of interests concerned with a specific issue-area can obtain 
access to and a hearing before those few individuals in leadership posi- 
tions who must make the actual decisions which determine national prior- 
ities. The Apollo experience suggests that, for the successful. adoption 
of a significantly new policy, this process must go on long enough prior 
to a top-level commitment to a particular course of action so that the 
Instead we have a representative political system through which 
sectors of society interested in the specific issue can be identified, their 
views heard and evaluated, and potential sources of support solicited. 
example, the relationship between space achievement and the national interest 
had been debated for over three years prior to Kennedy's decision. 
alignment of forces favoring and opposing a politically-oriented space 
program was clear, as was their relative political strengths. The issue 
had already been pushed up to the President for decision twice prior to 
April 1961, in the last months of the Eisenhower administration and in 
March 1961. 
For 
The 
There may be an analogy here between the notion of "technological 
sweetness," i.e., a technological possibility in which the plans for its 
accomplishment are so attractive that a decision to act on it is hard 
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- not to make, and some concept of "political sweetness." There may be 
an identifiable period of time in the life history of an issue in the 
political process during which the leadership, if it so decides, can 
seize upon the issue and transform it into government policy. 
which come to mind are civil rights legislation in 1964 and perhaps draft 
reform, control of environmental pollution, and tax reform in the near 
future, as well as space policy in 1961. 
Examples 
A crucial environmental factor determining whether the time is ripe 
for action in a particular issue-area is the "occasion for decision," 
especially with respect to presence of or lack of a crisis atmosphere. 
Successful new policies are seldom conceived in a crisis setting, but 
often a crisis serves to terminate a political process and to produce a 
policy outcome. An almost coincidental juxtaposition of a crisis setting 
and the political maturity of an issue, however, seems required to create 
a viable political base of support for a very ambitious government enter- 
prise like the moon project. The centrifugal forces of pluralism are so 
strong that some clear challenge, either from the external world or from 
the domestic sector outside the political system, is needed to allow the 
political leadership to choose among contending positions and groups on 
an issue and adopt goals representing significant changes in national 
policy. Without a challenge and subsequent crisis atmosphere, the American 
political system usually makes only incremental, adaptive shifts in policy. 42 
42 
One could be Machiavellian here and suggest that, if a crisis is 
lacking at a time when an issue is ripe for decision, the political leader- 
ship can fairly easily create one. 
nature of the government-media relationship today. I am not sure that 
a manufactured crisis would be as effective as an actual one in bringing 
together diverse interests in support of a common objective, but there 
is room for further examination of this hypothesis. 
This may well be true, given the 
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It is thus clear that the timing of an "Apollo-like" decision is 
vitally important. 
sion can be made with some confidence that it will be supported by 
influential political elements is conditioned by two factors: the poli- 
tical maturity of the issue under consideration and the presence of some 
challenge which dramatizes the need for action and removes political 
obstacles to its initiation. When these two factors are present, new 
enterprises can be successfully begun; when they are not, a decision to 
act runs a high risk of eventual failure. In 1961, both of these condi- 
tions were fully met. 
landing project as the likely candidate for the central feature of any 
politically-motivated space program, and the Gagarin flight and the Bay of 
Pigs demonstrated to the political leadership that such a program was in 
the American national interest. 
The political environment within which such a deci- 
There had been enough debate to identify the lunar 
Finally, an "Apollo approach" to the solution of national problems 
requires the kind of leadership which is able to combine broad vision with 
an expert political sense. The preceding discussion suggests that decision- 
makers must be able to identify and seize upon brief opportunities when 
the technological feasibility and the political feasibility of a parti- 
cular undertaking are in optimum balance. To do this, the leader must be 
able to convince influential individuals and groups in the political system 
that it is in their interest to support a program he believes is needed. 
Equally, he must be able to select an objective and a program which serves 
interests broader than those of specific interests and groups. 
jective must represent more than a limited response to a specific challenge, 
This ob- 
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a response which does not have long-term benefits to society at least 
equal to the societal resources the program to achieve it will consume. 
This type of leadership was present when the lunar landing decision 
It was not limited to President John Kennedy. was made. 
and James Webb both labored through several weeks of intense effort to 
ensure that the new space program for Kennedy's approval had merit beyond 
being a response to the political challenge symbolized by Gagarin's orbital 
flight. 
eminent capability for space operations of all kinds and in all areas of 
outer space, a capability they believed would constitute a national asset 
for years to come. They also made sure that this program would be struc- 
tured so that it would receive the continuing support of an already-existing 
aerospace constituency and would also create the larger constituency which 
would provide a continuing basis of political support. 
Lyndon Johnson 
They made sure that the program would result in developing a pre- 
However, the final choice was Kennedy's. Many of his advisers, such 
as Budget Director David Bell and economic adviser Walter Heller, told him 
that money spent on a large manned space flight program would not produce 
benefits for the United States as great as other possible uses of the same 
resources. 
power and pride of the American nation and its state required a program 
to establish the United States as the leading spacefaring country. 
committed himself to that objective, and came to view it as representative 
of some of the most basic motivations and aspirations of the people who 
had chosen him as their leader. 
Kennedy considered this advice, but ultimately decided that the 
He 
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The circumstances under which other decisions like the one to send 
Americans to the moon can be made and carried out seem, on the basis of 
the preceding analysis, to be these: 
The objective sought must be known to be technologically 
feasible, with a high degree of probability, at the 
time the decision to seek it is made. 
The objective must have been the subject of sufficient 
political debate so that the groups interested in it and 
opposed to it can be identified, their positions and relative 
strengths evaluated, and potential sources of support have 
time to develop. 
Some dramatic "occasion for decision," such as a crisis 
resulting from an external or domestic challenge, must 
occur to create an environment in which the objective and 
the policies to achieve it become politically feasible. 
There must be in leadership positions in the political 
system individuals whose personalities and political 
philosophies support the initiation of new large-scale 
government activities aimed at long-term payoffs and who 
have the political skill to choose the situations in which 
such activities can be initiated successfully. 
The lunar landing decision reflected a belief basic to liberal philoso- 
phy which is the core of the American world vlew. 
can cooperate in a common endeavor to better their individual conditions 
is based on assumptions about human nature and society which, as I remarked 
earlier, are at the core of liberal thought. 
achievement of social objectives can only be adopted in a society where this 
belief is held both by the general population and by the society's leadership. 
It may turn out that this approach can in fact only be used in the United 
States, where both confidence in our ability to attack and solve major prob- 
lems and a preference for technological "engineering" means to achieve our 
objectives are deeply ingrained. In this sense, the decision to go to the 
The idea that men 
The "Apollo approach" to the 
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moon may have been a uniquely American phenomenon. If this is so, then 
the United States may also be uniquely able to decide to use the tech- 
niques of organizing and directing energy which were so successful in 
Project Apollo for other worthwhile societal objectives. But this 
potential for achievement carries with it the danger of subverting the 
democratic principles upon which American society is based. 
The essence of the "Apollo approach" is concentration of effort 
and corresponding concentration of control. There is a constant tension 
between this concentration of control, which seems required if objectives 
of the scope of the lunar landing are to be chosen and implemented suc- 
cessfully, and the democratic ethic, which distrusts such a concentration 
of control and power. The final lesson of Apollo may be that such,a ten- 
sion can be maintained without either destroying democratic values or 
making concentrated govermment efforts impossible. To do this requires 
a watchful caution on the part of those called upon to support large- 
scale government-initiated enterprises which require central control over 
significant societal resources and activities. The purpose of government 
is to do things for a society which cannot be done by individual or combined 
private efforts. Sending men to the moon was one such thing. There are 
many others which are worth doing. But the organized energy which govern- 
ment can command must be applied in the interests of the whole society and 
ultimately of each individual in it. To make sure that this happens is a 
challenging assignment for each of us, for 
modern organization makes demands on the individual to 
learn something he has never been able to do before: 
to use organization'intelligently, purposefully, deliberately, 
responsibly. If he runs away from this task and his 
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decisions, organizations will indeed become the 
master. If the individual accepts this respon- 
sibility, he will be free and in control. 43 
The experience of Project Apollo shows it is indeed possible to 
organize other "great new American enterprises," intended to achieve 
objectives equal or greater in human significance than landing on the 
moon. It is up to us as citizens of this country to make sure that such 
enterprises do not in seeking their objectives destroy or diminish the 
values or beliefs they are intended to foster. 
Peter Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity: Guide- to Our 
43 
Changing Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p.  259 .  
